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               IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
              FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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                         Norfolk Division
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  ACTIVEVIDEO NETWORKS, INC.,
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                                            CIVIL ACTION
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                 Plaintiff,
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         V.
                                             2:10cv248
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   VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
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   et al.,
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                 Defendants
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
16
                        Norfolk, Virginia
                        October 24, 2011
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           (Motion for Preliminary Injunction Hearing)
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  Before: THE HONORABLE RAYMOND A. JACKSON
            United States District Judge
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1 Appearances: 2 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP 3 DANIEL JOHNSON, JR., ESQUIRE MICHAEL J. LYONS, ESQUIRE Counsel for the Plaintiff 4 and 5 KAUFMAN & CANOLES STEPHEN E. NOONA, ESQUIRE Ву: Local Counsel for the Plaintiff 6 7 SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP By: HENRY B. GUTMAN, ESQUIRE, ESQUIRE NOAH M. LEIBOWITZ, ESQUIRE 8 JOHN P. FRANTZ, ESQUIRE 9 and VERIZON CORPORATE RESOURCES GROUP JOHN THORNE, ESQUIRE 10 Counsel for the Defendants 11 and HUNTON & WILLIAMS By: GREGORY STILLMAN, ESQUIRE 12 Local Counsel for the Defendants 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

3 (Court convened at 10:05 a.m.) 1 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: ActiveVideo, Inc. versus 3 Verizon, Inc., et al. Civil action, 2:10cv248. Are plaintiff's counsel ready to proceed? 4 5 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, we are. 6 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Are defense counsel ready to 7 proceed? 8 MR. GUTMAN: We are. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 Gentlemen, we are here on a couple of matters. First, just some preliminary things I want to deal with. 11 12 I have ActiveVideo's motion, memorandum in support for leave to file notice for supplemental authority in 13 support of the motion for a preliminary injunction, and 14 15 Verizon's response to the motion. The motion will be 16 granted. The Court will read and digest both parties' 17 reaction to the supplemental authority in the process of considering what it will do about the injunction. 18 19 With respect to the motion to waive or, in the alternative, a proof of supersedeas bond, to stay 20 execution of judgment pending appeal, the Court has read 21 2.2 the memoranda of the parties. I don't know that you have 23 a lot more to say about this matter, to be candid with 24 But if you do, you certainly can tell me, but I

think you have made your position pretty clear in your

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pleadings, I'll be candid with you. If there's something
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   else you want to add, I will be glad to hear it.
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            MR. STILLMAN: Well, your Honor, as you know, if
   you ask a lawyer whether or not he has something to add,
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   it's an irresistible invitation.
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            THE COURT: Well, that's all right. The Court
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  lanticipated that.
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            MR. STILLMAN: May it please the Court.
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  Greg Stillman, here on behalf of Verizon, and I would
   like to address Verizon's motion with respect to the
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   bond, your Honor. And I don't have very much to add
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   that's not in our briefs, but I would like to say this:
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            First of all, as you know, this whole matter is
   soundly within the Court's discretion. What does that
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          That means that, obviously, the Court has to look
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   at some factors. This is not an automatic issue. If it
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   were an automatic issue, then the opportunity for us to
   make this motion would not be available. So the Court
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   has to look at some factors. And with respect to those
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   factors, we think it is entirely appropriate to look at a
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   balancing of harm. There's been some suggestion in the
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   briefing that the Court should essentially do an
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   injunction-type analysis.
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            Well, if, in fact, the Court did that and if, in
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   |fact, the Court engaged in any balancing-of-harm
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analysis, I think that analysis would show quite clearly 1 that the Court should exercise its discretion and not 2 3 require a separate supersedeas undertaking by Verizon in 4 this case. And the reason for that is quite simple. 5 Verizon has demonstrated, I believe, to the Court's satisfaction that it has significant resources available 7 to satisfy any judgment. The real question, in our mind, is whether 8 9 ActiveVideo has the resources to pay the cost of this 10 bond if, in fact, the case is ultimately reversed, because, as you know, that is a taxable cost to the 11 12 loser. 13 There's no question but that Verizon has the 14 ability to satisfy this judgment, and, in fact, the 15 evidence would suggest that Verizon is in a better 16 position financially with its cash balance than, perhaps, most of the said surety companies who would undertake 17 18 such a bond. 19 So the real question is why are we doing this? 20 And the simple answer from our perspective is that this 21 is nothing more than an effort to be punitive with 2.2 respect to Verizon, an effort to somehow extract every 23 pound of flesh that can be extracted, and there's no 24 reason for it. It's a taxable cost that ultimately 25 ActiveVideo would have to bear if it's not successful in

the appeal of the case. 1 2 So for all of those reasons, it's our view that 3 the Court should exercise its discretion. It's not going 4 to harm ActiveVideo not to require this unnecessary 5 expenditure, which is going to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and so we would respectfully ask that our motion be granted. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Johnson. 8 9 MR. JOHNSON: Good morning, Your Honor. 10 There are two points. Number one, in the ITC 11 action when Verizon was litigating against Cablevision 12 and it thought it was going to get, effectively, an 13 exclusion order, it didn't claim at that point that a 14 bond was necessary. In fact, it argued that it was 15 entitled to a hundred percent bond because of its 16 irreparable injury suffered while Cablevision is continuing to improperly utilize the '740 patent, which, 17 as we know, is invalid. 18 19 The reason the bond is proper in this case is, 20 in fact, Verizon has been found to be infringing. While 21 I am very confident they may be around in the two-year 2.2 period it's going to take to complete the process, I'm 23 sure there were people that thought AIG was going to be 24 around prior to the point in time in which it went under. 25 We are not here to have to take any risks, your

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Honor. We don't want to take any risks. The reality is a bond is appropriate. We know where the source of revenue is going to come from. We don't have to chase it. And the law is clear that it is the exception when a bond is not required, and the only case cited involved a public utility.

Nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay, gentlemen. The Court has given considerable thought to the arguments of both

given considerable thought to the arguments of both parties with respect to this question of whether a bond should be required, and the argument that Verizon makes that they should not be required to post a bond because they are fully able to pay the bond and that it would be a waste of time and a waste of resources to be paying \$350,000 a year has a certain amount of appeal to the Court.

On the other hand, the argument that ActiveVideo makes about the posting of a bond also has, I think, solid ground. What the Court has looked at, the Court has looked at all of these issues. The Court notes that both parties have different approaches to analyzing the question of whether the bond should be required, and certainly the issue of balance of harms was raised. The Court did wonder about whether ActiveVideo wanted to take the chance that if they should lose, they would be

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subject to several hundred thousand dollars in taxable costs to be paid, but the Court also understands at this juncture that's not an issue that the Court should rely on in trying to determine whether a bond should issue. That's ActiveVideo's risk and their problem if they lose and not obtain a bond. The Court has read Rule 62(d) and the Court has read a lot of the cases you have raised, and the Court finds nothing in this circuit that carves out an exception to the requirement that bond be posted for a stay under these circumstances. Now, in terms of costs, I do not believe that the parties, and certainly Verizon has not, spared any cost in litigating this case. I read the submission with the affidavits of Ms. Small and Mr. Stillman and note that certainly, in fact, if Verizon had \$6.1 billion of cash on hand and a \$6.1 billion line of credit, then the capability of paying a bond is no question; they can do it and are fully capable of doing it. So that cuts against Verizon's arguments about just wasted money. Verizon hasn't spared any cost in litigating this case. In fact, I think it's probably been a waste of money in this case, from what the Court has observed, by both parties. The Court believes that when it balances all of

the considerations in this case that it will require that 1 2 a supersedeas bond be posted in this case. The Court 3 further believes that the \$115 million is inadequate. The Court entered a supplemental order. I 4 5 understand that you went to Liberty Mutual and got the bond before the Court issued that opinion in October for 6 supplemental damages, for prejudgment interest, which really brings the total amount of the judgment the Court 8 has before it now up to 139 million. That doesn't even 9 10 include any taxable cost or potential post-judgment 11 interest. 12 So the Court believes that a \$115 million bond is inadequate and so the Court is going to do what it 13 14 should do here, and that is the Court is going to grant a 15 stay to Verizon in this case, but pending appeal, the 16 Court is going to require you post the \$145 million supersedeas bond, and that is probably on the low side. 17 The Court went and tried to just presumptively calculate 18 maybe the amount of time it might take for this appeal, 19 20 any taxable costs, that's probably low, but I think it's reasonable. So the Court is going to require that 21 2.2 Verizon post a \$145 million supersedeas bond pending the 23 appeal in this case, and that's the order the Court will 24 enter in this case. 25 I thank you-all for your arguments, but it's

reasonable. I think it's well-grounded. It doesn't 1 matter that Verizon is capable of paying. If it's 2 3 capable of paying, it should be no problem. So that's the Court's order. You will get a written order to that 4 effect, and I will leave it to you when you post the 5 bond. When you post the bond, then the stay in this case will go into effect in accordance with Rule 62(d) pending 8 the appeal. 9 Is there anything else on this issue? 10 All right, fine. Let's move to the injunction. 11 On this injunction, now, once again, the Court has read the memoranda of the parties, gone backwards and 12 13 forwards to see who has the stronger side of the argument 14 in this case, and at this juncture the Court, again, 15 takes the same position it took with the bond. The Court is not going to be making any ruling on this injunction 16 from the bench. I'm not going to do that. I'm going to 17 hear your arguments to see if you have anything that's in 18 addition to what you have filed, and the Court will be 19 20 able to move pretty quickly. Probably before the end of 21 the week you will get an opinion back out of here on this 2.2 issue. 23 I have spent considerable time looking at it 24 already, but there are some things that the Court does 25 not know about your positions, and the Court suspects

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that you have probably refined your position or
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   supplemented your position in this hearing this morning,
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  and the Court has some questions about some of the things
   that you are suggesting that are not clear for the
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   record, and so the Court remains to be educated on this
   question of an injunction.
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            It's not a quick call after the eBay decision
   about what the Court should, in fact, do.
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            So, all right, Mr. Johnson.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor.
            THE COURT: Be mindful of the fact that you have
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   already written substantially about this issue.
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            MR. JOHNSON: I am, your Honor, and I fully
  intend to focus on certain specific issues.
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            THE COURT: All right.
            MR. JOHNSON: We cited the Bosch decision to the
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   Court because it is the first, in my opinion,
   pronouncement since eBay which we think properly
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   elucidates the requirements for the issuance of an
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   injunction and identifies factors for the Court to
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   consider.
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            The first point to be made is the question of
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  irreparable injury, then we have to address remedies, and
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   then, obviously, the balance of the hardship. That's the
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   test. But the Bosch court started off by saying, "One of
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the critical issues in determining whether or not to grant an injunctive relief is, is there competition by the parties in the particular segment of this market?" And Bosch went through and did an analysis of the market 4 segment. In this case what Verizon says is, We don't 7 compete with ActiveVideo directly. That is simply not 8 true. ActiveVideo has its CloudTV technology. CloudTV technology, as Mr. Miller set out in his declaration, and as an aside, there has been no rebuttal, is that CloudTV provides VOD and interactive services 12 using the software and professional services to 13 customers. The customers then are able to provide the VOD and interactive services to its clients. 14 Verizon provides VOD and interactive services to 16 its clients or its subscribers as well using software. 17 That software has been found to infringe. So when Verizon tells the Court we are not direct competitors, 18 they are saying, well, these two are not -- ActiveVideo 20 is not a cable company. Well, it's true, but it doesn't mean that there isn't direct competition, because without the ActiveVideo software, neither Verizon or its 2.2 23 customers would be able to offer the VOD interactive 24 services. In Bosch the Court identified one market, the

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In that situation, Bosch provided the blades OEM market. to a third party, Pylon did not. Bosch said, By using our infringing technology, Pylon affects the amount of money we can get, it affects the number of customers we can secure, and finally, it erodes our business brand. And the Court said that was sufficient to give rise to linjunctive relief. What did Mr. Miller say in his declaration, followed by the senior vice president of Cablevision? One, we receive our money based upon supplying our software to Cablevision, providing the professional services to Cablevision, and then we get paid based upon the number of streams, that is to say, the number of subscribers that use the Cablevision service. therefore, if subscribers are lost to Cablevision, it necessarily follows that ActiveVideo's CloudTV technology is rendered less valuable. Now, how do we know that? We know that because in the ITC Verizon made the identical argument. In it, it said, quote, If Cablevision -- and this is page 32 of 39. In the situation where the argument was, Can you calculate injury based upon potential loss to subscribers? Here's what Verizon said. "If Cablevision is able during the review period to continue importing and infringing STB, set-top boxes, and provide them to

its customers, the competitive harm to Verizon will not 1 be limited to the difference between the monthly 2 3 equipment fee or service price charged by its company. For example, Cablevision might acquire a new customer 4 5 during the review period and provide that customer with fringing STB. Through this unfair act, Cablevision will have deprived Verizon of the opportunity to serve that 8 customer for an indefinite amount of time, however long 9 the customer remains with Cablevision and receives its services. The amount of that harm cannot be measured 10 before it occurs. Indeed, Cablevision admits that these 11 12 unique circumstances make it impossible to fashion an 13 appropriate bond." 14 That's what they said in the ITC. Here they 15 say, Oh, we could compensate ActiveVideo by money if 16 there was a reasonable royalty. That's totally 17 inconsistent with that position I have just read to you, your Honor, and the reason is you don't know how many 18 19 subscribers you've lost; you don't know if you will ever 20 get them back. And here's what we do know. Verizon's 21 2.2 technology it is using to deliver VOD and interactive 2.3 services has been found to infringe ActiveVideo's 24 technology and its patents. Because of that, we then 25 say, Well, what is the impact if your technology is and

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has, in fact, been infringed? And what did Verizon say? Quote, Here the ALJ found in Cablevision, which competes against Verizon in the New York City Metropolitan area, infringes Verizon's '740 patent by incorporating Verizon's patent and technology. Cablevision is, therefore, not only benefiting unfairly from Verizon's investment and innovation as a general matter, it is doing so to undermine Verizon in specific markets where the two companies compete. The public interest is best served by requiring companies to compete on fair terms, not by allowing one company to use the patented technology of its direct competitor without authorization." That's what they said in the ITC. They come here today and they are saying, Well, just because this Court and a jury after a three-week trial found that we infringed four patents, we ought to be able to continue using the ActiveVideo technology competing against Cablevision as well as the other ten states in which we operate. That's diametrically opposed to what they told the ITC. If the logic applied then, it applies now. It is fundamentally unfair, and the Bosch Court made that point in saying injunctive relief is improper under that circumstance. The interesting thing about the Bosch case, Bosch is a huge company and it was conceded

that wiper blades was not a major part of Bosch's 1 2 business. 3 In our case, all our business is CloudTV. That is our business. So by allowing Verizon to continue to 4 behave in the fashion it is doing without injunction, our 5 core business is being fundamentally affected, and it's being fundamentally affected in several ways. Mr. Miller said and as Cablevision said, without using 8 9 ActiveVideo's technology, Verizon would have a difficult time competing for subscribers, and it would have a 10 higher churn rate, that is to say, it would lose 11 12 customers. That is incalculable in two ways: Number one, Verizon continues to maintain its 13 advantage; and, secondly, ActiveVideo does not receive 14 15 the benefits of the money it invested in this particular 16 technology. 17 Moving on, your Honor. On the question of 18 whether or not the granting of an injunction would somehow unfairly harm Verizon, here's what Verizon had to 19 say in the ITC. "Because Cablevision customers can 20 readily obtain comparable STBs and television services 21 2.2 from other service providers, including Verizon, a 23 remedial order would have no negative effect on 24 consumers." 25 They went on to say -- and that is at page 22 of

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28, your Honor. Then at page 19 of 39 Verizon says, "Moreover, even if the Commission had authority to state a remedy in this investigation, it should decline to do so. A stay would cause irreparable harm to Verizon. The ALJ has determined, and the Commission has confirmed, that Cablevision violated Section 337. If the Commission delays in remedying that violation, Cablevision will be able to continue violating the statute and Verizon's intellectual property and Verizon will have no recourse." Stated another way, your Honor, the U.S. Constitution and the statute gave my client the right to exclude, and Bosch says that is a considerable factor that must be considered in making a decision to grant or deny injunctive relief. In this case Verizon at every turn has made it as expensive as possible for my client, has stated openly and publicly that it's not going to pay a dime. It went into the ITC and made the following statement concerning this Court's determination about the invalidity of the '748: "Cablevision has not offered any reason to import conclusive preference to the District Court's decision, which was reached without oral argument, without the support of expert testimony, and without the full evidentiary record." In other words, your decision, according to the Verizon and the ITC, was not entitled to

any weight because Verizon had not been afforded due 1 process of law. That's what they told the ITC. 2 3 Now, we stand here today and I have just heard the argument about Verizon being worth billions. 4 client was ridiculed during the trial for having spent 5 \$300 million to keep their company afloat and not having made a profit. Now Verizon says, Well, they should 8 continue going forward while we use their technology and 9 struggle in the marketplace. Injunction was designed to 10 protect the very situation you have here. So what is Verizon's first argument? They argue 11 we are not directly competitors because Gary Lauder says 12 13 everything is for sale except his children. besides being amusing, is irrelevant to the analysis. 14 15 They then say, Well, Mr. Wagner then said that 16 they were not competitors because he didn't do an 17 analysis on profit. 18 What we have here is Mr. Miller, who gave us a 19 declaration, and Mr. Miller is here today, in which he 20 said, Our technology, the cloud technology, is all we've 21 got and we are losing money, we are losing subscribers, 2.2 and he backed it up with the declaration from 2.3 Cablevision. 24 What do we have on the other side? Nothing 25 other than what can only be described as a whimsical

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argument by Dr. Carlton who said if there had been a
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   reasonable royalty and we had decided to go with
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  ActiveVideo, we would have created additional competition
   and that would have benefited ActiveVideo; and,
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   therefore, they are not injured.
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            Well, first of all, A, it didn't happen;
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            B, at this point, having spent the multiple
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  millions of dollars we spent to defend our technology and
  having Dr. Carlton make it clear that he wasn't conceding
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   that there was a reasonable royalty rate, despite what
   the jury did, we are supposedly going to be made whole in
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   the very way that Verizon told the ITC we could not be
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   made whole. How is that? By losing customers that we
   might get a royalty for of some unspecified amount.
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            If it wasn't proper in the ITC when they thought
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   they had the upper hand, it is certainly not proper here.
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            Now, obviously, we have gone, as I said, in
   great detail outlining the fact, but fundamentally, your
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   Honor, here's where this thing comes down to: We tried
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   this case. We got an injunction. They fought us every
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   step of the way.
            THE COURT: A verdict, not an injunction.
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            MR. JOHNSON: We got a verdict. We need an
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   injunction, and we need an injunction because every day
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   they are in the market using our infringing technology,
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and that's where we are now, they are using our infringing technology to acquire subscribers who, as the declaration from Cablevision makes clear, they would have difficulty getting without our technology, and they are able to compete unfairly. Cablevision declaration, your Honor, paragraph 111. "Without our technology, Verizon would have more difficulty attracting customers and their churn rate would go up. " So, in effect, what Verizon wants, they didn't want to pay a bond. They don't want to address the consequences of this jury's decision or face the consequences of this jury's decision, which is if you have got technology that you can use that doesn't infringe, it's incumbent upon you to use it. If not, what do you have to do? In this case you can still have your cable system. You can still offer video. You just can't offer Video On Demand with interactive services. In our view, that is perfectly appropriate and proper, and it's the only way we are ever going to get Verizon's attention. Thank you. THE COURT: You made a reference to the fact that you said that they are infringing with the use of the technology --MR. JOHNSON: Yes.

1 THE COURT: -- of the patent. 2 How many FiOS customers does Verizon have? 3 heard something about 4 million at one time. Do you know 4 exactly how many? 5 MR. JOHNSON: To our knowledge before trial it The latest number we heard was 4 million to 4.1 6 million. Here's what else we know, because we proved it at trial, at the beginning of 2005 their strategy to 8 9 attract customers to their new venture, because, as you 10 know, it was built from the ground up, was the use of VOD 11 and interactive services as the distinguishing 12 characteristic over the other cable companies. 13 THE COURT: An argument, I believe, was made that in the event the Court decided to issue an 14 15 injunction, a sunset provision should be considered and Verizon could very well pay a certain amount per 16 17 subscriber. I'm trying to remember, I have read so much in this case I'm getting dizzy, whether you reacted in 18 your briefs to that suggestion by Verizon. There's some 19 20 case law that talks about sunset provisions. That's true, and we did not for 21 MR. JOHNSON: 2.2 two reasons: Number one, Verizon's strategy is to delay 2.3 the inevitable for as long as it can, and so they will 24 say anything. And when I say anything, here's what I 25 They talked about that sunset provision, but they

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never told the Court this would be a royalty rate that we
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   would be prepared to accept. In fact, they never set a
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  royalty rate. That's even against the background.
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            My client's view is our right to exclude gives
  us the right to determine if Verizon is going to be
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   permitted to use our technology or not.
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            THE COURT: But the Court has to look at all the
   potential options.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Correct.
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            THE COURT: The Court doesn't know what it's
   going to do. But let's assume, hypothetically, the Court
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   granted an injunction providing a sunset provision. I am
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   aware there's some testimony about Verizon working on
   alternatives that might take six to nine months or
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   something of that nature.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Sure, correct.
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            THE COURT: Has ActiveVideo given any
   consideration to any such subscriber, what type of rate
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   it would want per subscriber in the event the Court
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   ordered a sunset provision?
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            MR. JOHNSON: Two points, your Honor.
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   answer is no, because there was never a statement by
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   Verizon as to what that rate would be.
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            But if you were speaking of the rate, you have
   to look at the rate in the following context: Under the
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jury's verdict, the rate per subscriber was one thirteen.
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            THE COURT: One hundred thirteen bucks.
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            MR. JOHNSON: A dollar thirteen per subscriber.
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            MR. GUTMAN: Per subscriber per month.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Per subscriber per month. Okay?
  |So that rate was -- and the jury found there was no
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  willful conduct.
            All right. The rate we asked for was two twenty
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  five per subscriber per month. Obviously, the jury
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   divided it. However, we are in post-judgment world now,
   so now Verizon's conduct is willful. Not only is it
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   willful, but we would be entitled to a post-judgment
   royalty in an amount that reflects Verizon's ongoing
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   infringement.
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            The case law requires two things under those
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   circumstances: Either an agreement of the parties or a
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   separate hearing to determine what the reasonable royalty
   rate should be.
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            If you were to ask me today what I thought the
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   reasonable royalty rate should be, and again, I said my
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   view is our right to exclude, which, by the way, gives us
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   huge advantage with our customers and potential customers
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   because not having Verizon as a competitor increases our
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   ability to improve our contractual relationship with the
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   cable company such as Comcast, who competes head to head
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with Verizon. If Verizon can't offer VOD and interactive 1 2 services, we get a better deal with Comcast. That's 3 simply the reality. 4 So if the Court were to say either have a 5 hearing to argue about what a royalty reasonable is -- if so, we will come back and we will do that, but I want to 6 do it ASAP if that has to happen -- or, B, what's your 8 It's not one thirteen. We are now willful. 9 want two twenty-five per subscriber per month, and we don't want to be in the situation where Verizon can 10 decide in six or nine months whether or not it has come 11 12 up with a noninfringing alternative. We want there to be 13 a minimum of a one-year period, from August 2nd to August 14 2nd, because I have no doubt, and I'm sure the Court has 15 no doubt, the minute they come out with their so-called noninfringing alternative, you are going to see us right 16 17 back here saying the proof of the pudding is in the ink, 18 and we are likely going to have to have another hearing 19 because I don't think they can do it, despite the 20 assertions to the contrary. 21 THE COURT: Well, that's certainly 2.2 hypothetically. That wouldn't be the Court's concern, 23 because if the Court put in a sunset provision, then it 24 would simply mean an injunction would become effective on 25 the date the Court said it would become effective, and

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that's what the Court means. It wouldn't be conditioned
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   on whether some alternative works or doesn't work.
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  That's not an issue the Court would be concerned about.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Right.
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            THE COURT: The Court would be concerned about
  if the Court enters an injunction, the injunction is
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  effective when the Court says it's effective.
            MR. JOHNSON: Understood. Understood, your
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   Honor. I stand corrected.
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            THE COURT: So that's one thing.
            All right. Anything else you want to add?
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            MR. JOHNSON: Not at this point. I would like
  to reserve some time for rebuttal.
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            THE COURT: All right. I have a feeling we are
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   going to be doing a seesaw here.
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            MR. JOHNSON: It wouldn't be the first time.
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            THE COURT: What can you do to inform the Court
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   on these issues, Mr. Gutman?
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            MR. GUTMAN: I would be happy to, your Honor.
   Good morning, Hank Gutman.
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            THE COURT: Good morning.
            MR. GUTMAN: Hank Gutman for Verizon.
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            Let me start with a couple of points that
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  Mr. Johnson put a lot of emphasis on. He spoke a lot
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   about the right to exclude, and I would just remind the
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Court, and I know the Court spent a lot of time with 1 these decisions and probably doesn't need the reminder, 2 3 but the right to exclude is both Justice Thomas's decision for the Court in eBay and Justice Kennedy's 4 5 decision for a concurring opinion for four justices that eBay is the right. It says nothing about the remedy. doesn't mean that an injunction is automatic. The whole point of the eBay decision was that an injunction is no 8 9 longer automatic, it's not presumed. 10 As the Bosch decision makes clear, it's not even rebuttably presumed, and the right to exclude exists in 11 12 every patent case. 13 So if that is entitled to the kind of weight that my friend, Mr. Johnson, has been arguing, then there 14 15 would be an injunction in every case, and we all know now in the post-eBay world that is not even close to being 16 17 true. 18 They have to prove a number of things, four 19 factors. The key ones here are irreparable injury and that damages are not an adequate remedy of law, and they 20 can't do that. Since eBay no commercial entity, none, 21 2.2 not one, has gotten an injunction unless it was against a 23 direct competitor. 24 And let me put an even finer point on it. You 25 know, we get into the direct versus indirect and all of

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that stuff.
                We don't have to get that fancy.
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                                                   There has
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   not been a single injunction post-eBay granted against a
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  customer or potential customer.
            THE COURT: Now, does that mean that one is not
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  warranted or that no judge exercised its decision to
   grant one?
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            MR. GUTMAN: It means none is warranted, your
  |Honor, because there's no irreparable injury in that
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   situation.
               That's the basic point. When you are dealing
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   between -- not between competitors. I mean, the BroadCom
   and QualComm case cited in the papers, those were direct
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   competitors. The Bosch and Pylon those were direct
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   competitors. Judge O'Malley's decision from the Federal
   Circuit could not have been more clear on that point.
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            I am going to spend a little time on Bosch, and
   we are going to walk through each of the distinctions at
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   a level Mr. Johnson didn't.
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            THE COURT: Let me ask you this right now as you
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   get started: Are there any cases out there that deal
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   with the factual situation that this Court is confronted
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   with here where you have indirect competitors? You know,
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   there's a first time for everything.
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            MR. GUTMAN:
                        Well, what they are calling an
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   indirect competitor, your Honor, is a supplier-customer
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   relationship. And, yes, I think z4 was one of those
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decisions. There are a whole bunch cited in our briefs 1 2 where courts denied injunctions in those decisions 3 because there is an adequate remedy at law, namely 4 damages. 5 If we cut through all the terminology and just think about it for a minute, it makes sense that that 6 |would be true because the customer or potential customer is something the patent holder would have been very happy 8 to make a deal with to provide them. And if you make the 9 10 deal, what do you get? You get money. The reason why a direct competitor is different 11 is if you have got a patent that's significant, you might 12 13 not be willing to license that patent to your direct competitor and give up your competitive advantage for any 14 15 amount of money. That's the difference. That's the 16 difference. That's why no court has found, and I think there's a reason for that, that there is that kind of a 17 irreparable injury when it's supplier and customer, and 18 19 that is clearly undeniably what the relationship is 20 here. Every single witness of theirs at trial in this 21 case, at deposition in this case, and the testimony that 2.2 was read and played to the jury described the 23 relationship that way. 24 Let me just take Mr. Wagner. I have got his 25 page handy. "Is it your opinion that ActiveVideo would

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not lose sales by licensing to Verizon?" That's exactly
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   the question.
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            "I have not calculated any lost profits here, so
  that's correct."
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            And if you look at his expert report where one
   of the Georgia Pacific factors asks about that, he said,
   "That factor is neutral because there's no evidence that
   they would lose any sales."
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            It goes on: "ActiveVideo doesn't participate in
   the marketing and selling of video services as does
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  Verizon?"
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12
            "That's correct."
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            "Verizon is not in the business of selling VOD
  hardware and software to other providers of video
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  services?"
16
            "They are not."
            "It is, therefore, your opinion that ActiveVideo
17
  and Verizon are not competitors?"
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19
            "That's accurate."
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            This is the opinion their expert stated on the
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  witness stand under oath in this case subject to
   cross-examination and direct examination. He didn't say,
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   oh, but they are an indirect competitor; they are just
24
   not a direct competitor. All the explanations and
   excuses and all of the wiggling that we see in the
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injunction papers, none of that was there when the man 1 2 was on the stand. And your Honor will see in our papers that we 3 have got a list of all of their witnesses. Villalpando, 4 O'Callaghan, Mr. Miller himself, all of them testified 5 that we were a customer, or potential customer, or, gee, we wish we could have them as a customer. described has as a competitor, either direct or indirect. 8 Forget the direct and indirect for a 9 THE COURT: 10 The jury found that Verizon's patent infringes. So, in effect, you are arguing that your infringement has 11 12 no impact on ActiveVideo? 13 MR. GUTMAN: What I'm arguing is there's no irreparable injury because we are not a direct 14 15 competitor. We are not a competitor of any sort. It's 16 not that there's no impact, your Honor, there is, but 17 it's one that's measurable by damages, as the jury did 18 and as your Honor subsequently did. 19 But in terms of whether our impact of our 20 presence in the market helps them or hurts them, their 21 own Mr. Taylor testified, and again, remember him, your 2.2 Honor, he was the sales guy or marketing guy, and this 23 was in some of his deposition testimony, he compared himself to an arms merchant. He said if Verizon is in 24 25 the market with their product which has nice features

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that customers want, that makes it easier for him to sell
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   to Verizon's competitors because they need to arm up
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  with, you know, their CloudTV and the menuing system, and
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   things like that, that ActiveVideo sells in order to
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   compete with Verizon. So what he testified to under oath
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   was that far from hurting their sales, we helped them.
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            So the notion that we are irreparably injuring
   them is just not true.
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            And then the further point on that is they
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   gladly would have licensed us at any point, even apart
   from Gary Lauder's statement about how for the right
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   price they would have licensed, they would have sold us
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   the patents.
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            THE COURT: Case law cuts against you on that
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   argument, the fact that they might have been willing to
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   license you at some point.
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            MR. GUTMAN:
                        What the case law says is that
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   issue is not outcome determinative, and we are not
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   arguing that that issue, standing alone, is outcome
   determinative. But it's the natural state of things when
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   you have got a supplier and customer, it cuts against an
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   injunction.
                It doesn't alone mean there can't be an
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   injunction, but it certainly weighs on our side of the
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   equation. Case law doesn't quarrel with that, your
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   Honor.
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But the law is clear, and again, if there was a case that said supplier-customer, irreparable injury, I'm sure we would have seen it, but they don't cite one and we haven't found one. THE COURT: So, in other words, if the Court sees fit to issue an injunction on this scenario, it |would be whole new ground? MR. GUTMAN: Your Honor would be making new law. THE COURT: It would be Daniel Boone and the law, you would be cutting new territory. MR. GUTMAN: It would absolutely be new law, your Honor. It would be an unprecedented decision, which is one reason why we would urge your Honor, as a court of equity, which at this point you are sitting in inequity, we would urge your Honor to not be too quick to decide to do that. There's a good reason other courts haven't done it, and that's because in the supplier-customer situation the injury is not irreparable. And all of the stuff Mr. Johnson was quoting from the ITC, all the statements there, that was a case between Cablevision and Verizon. They are direct competitors. They are direct competitors, absolutely. Verizon competes with other cable companies. It doesn't compete with ActiveVideo. They don't compete with us; we don't compete

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Every witness in this case said that. with them. said, Oh, yeah, we don't compete directly, but we compete |indirectly. Not a single witness said that until we got to the affidavit for this injunction proceeding. THE COURT: Now, if the evidence was that Verizon's infringement of the patent deteriorated or diminished the value of the patent to ActiveVideo, it devalued it, it diminished it, wouldn't that be different and significant, notwithstanding the fact that it's not a customer, is not a supplier-customer relationship? MR. GUTMAN: Right. THE COURT: That's an "if." MR. GUTMAN: Right, and two things. I appreciate that your Honor said "if," and I appreciate that particularly because there's zero evidence in this record that the value of the patent has been diminished. Indeed, I would suggest to the Court, and I think it's just a matter of common sense as we stand now based on the jury verdict, and the rather sizable award of damages, and the supplementation of those damages, and the subsequent decision by the Court, I would say that patent is sitting pretty pretty in terms of its value. There's been no diminution of the value, and if Verizon were permitted to continue with its business, subject to having to pay sizable royalties along the lines of what's

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been established by the jury and implemented by your
Honor in the supplemental award, that would certainly
make those patents more valuable to them than they have
ever been before.
         But the further point, your Honor -- so there's
no record that the value has been diminished and, if
anything, it's been enhanced by the jury verdict. But if
there are damage awards that could compensate for that
injury, then you don't have an injunction.
         THE COURT: Okay.
                            That has always been the case
as far back as the Court can remember. If there's a
valuable economic remedy, there's really no grounds for
an injunction. But the thing that the Court is wondering
about even in the aftermath of eBay where there's no
automatic presumption that you get an injunction where an
infringement is established, what's the point almost of
even winning an infringement case in a patent case if the
remedy is always going to be that you simply pay if you
get caught? What's the point? Why not infringe? Just
pay if you get caught.
         MR. GUTMAN: Well, I mean, that's a very good
question, your Honor, and let me respond to that. First
of all, if you infringe willfully --
         THE COURT: It's still just more money. That's
all, it's just more money.
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Oh, I understand, but that's a lot MR. GUTMAN: more money. And, again, we all recall the jury here. |Mr. Johnson talks about us behaving poorly. The jury here found against him on willfulness. So, you know, what the jury verdict shows is we bought products from third parties, SeaChange and Cisco, that we implemented in our system and the jury has now concluded, subject to whatever the Court of Appeals may say, that that So, you know, we are where we are on that. But if you go out and you intentionally, knowingly infringe somebody's patents, then you are liable for willfulness and that is a penalty beyond the economic injury and that should be -- I think the law is designed to make that a deterrent. 14 But, again, the point of the injunction, and this is another point that gets lost in their papers, but 16 I think it's clear, crystal clear, in the case law and we cites the cases on this, the point of an injunction is not to punish. It's not to punish. And if you listen to ActiveVideo's argument, your Honor, it's all about punishing us. It's making us pay for our --THE COURT: Let me assure you, Mr. Gutman, no 23 matter what this Court does, that's not and never been 24 the intent of any injunction this judge has ever issued. MR. GUTMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor.

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                        Punishment, that's not an issue.
            THE COURT:
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            MR. GUTMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor.
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  the issue of whether the infringement was culpable some
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   way rather than just innocent, because patent
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   infringement can be innocent -- you can infringe a patent
   without even knowing it's there. We did it, at least in
  the eyes of the jury. -- obviously, we reserve our right
   to challenge them. I don't want to be waiving anything
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          But that culpability thing has a standard or
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   issue, and it has nothing to do with whether or not an
   injunction gets issued. And the clearest indication of
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   that is if you look back at eBay, which was what gave
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   rise to this in the Supreme Court and then came back, and
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   Judge Friedman on remand again denied the injunction.
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   The jury found willfulness in eBay; that is, the jury
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   found in that case meeting the high standard for
   willfulness, post-Seagate.
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            THE COURT: So then willfulness had nothing to
   do with whether an injunction should issue or not.
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            MR. GUTMAN: Exactly right.
            THE COURT: So the Court understands that.
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   Culpability has nothing to do with that.
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            MR. GUTMAN:
                         Right.
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            THE WITNESS:
                          It's the balancing of these four
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   factors that the Court has been and still must wrestle
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with.
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            MR. GUTMAN:
                        Exactly, your Honor.
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            So moving to the second, we have talked about
  irreparable injury and the fact no court has found
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   irreparable injury in a situation like this.
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            The second point is, well, are damages an
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  adequate remedy?
                    And I would suggest to your Honor that
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   based on the size of the verdict in this case, damages --
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   and relative to, again, I'm not trying to pick on them
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   for their failures in business in the marketplace, but
   your Honor will recall the testimony. The cumulative
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   total over 30 years of revenues they generated from their
   business was $15 million.
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            THE COURT: This sounds like an argument this is
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   big change for a small fee company is what you are
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   arguing now.
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            MR. GUTMAN:
                        What I'm arguing, your Honor, is
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   that looking at it in gross, looking at it in gross, it
   is $100 million more than they ever made in 30 years of
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   business, which suggests that the damages are an adequate
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   remedy.
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            If you view it in terms of what they get per
23
   subscriber, which is another measurement, under their
24
   Cablevision view where they are arguing that if we aren't
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   enjoined, they are going to lose supplemental subscribers
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in Cablevision, they get 17 cents per subscriber under 1 the Cablevision deal. 2 Under the royalty in the jury verdict as applied 3 by your Honor in the supplemental damages award, as 4 5 Mr. Johnson said, they get one thirteen per subscriber. So not only is it measurable, but it works in their 7 favor. So, again, I don't think on this record there's 8 9 any showing that damages are not an adequate remedy. 10 think more than adequate, we think excessive, but again, the parties disagree with that and the Court has accepted 11 12 the jury's verdict as appropriate. 13 But that's relative to what they have done in the real world. Relative to what they are saying they 14 15 might get less of if we aren't enjoined, 17 cents per 16 incremental customer, and that's just in New York. You 17 know, Cablevision is just in the New York area. They are 18 looking for an injunction against us all across the country. We are paying royalties all across -- you know, 19 20 the jury verdict and supplemental judgment address 21 royalties on a nationwide basis, all 4 million 2.2 subscribers, not just the ones in New York. 23 So, again, the economics do not suggest that 24 they are somehow hurt in some noneconomic way, or 25 immeasurable way, or damages-can't-make-them-whole way by

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us being allowed to continue. Now let me talk about Bosch for a minute. Bosch the Federal Circuit reversed the district court for having denied an injunction based on two arguments that we never made in this case. So they aren't relevant to the arguments we have made against the injunction here. THE COURT: They are or are not? Are not. The two arguments the MR. GUTMAN: district court in Delaware found sufficient to deny an injunction are not arguments we have made here. first is the argument that, well, you only have irreparable injury. And, again, this was a case against direct competitors, unlike our case. You can only have irreparable injury if it's a two-player market where you can say with certainty that every sale one loses, the The district court in Delaware found that other gains. out from determining that -- in fact, I think there are a line of cases in Delaware where the district judges have found that as a basis for denying the injunction even between direct competitors. The Federal Circuit said no, that's not outcome determinative. And the second was the argument that it wasn't their main product, that they have other core product, that they had other products, that windshield wipers weren't the whole deal. Again, the Court of Appeals said

that doesn't mean you don't get an injunction. 1 doesn't mean you do, but it doesn't mean you don't. 2 3 So the Court reversed on two grounds, and neither of those arguments were ever made by us here, 4 ever, and our briefing was all done before Bosch. That's 5 just not our basis. 6 So what the Court did, though, was it decided in that case, in Bosch, that an injunction should be granted 8 9 based on three factors, not one of which is present in this case. 10 First, they found that in all three channels of 11 distribution it was undisputed, that each of these, Judge 12 O'Malley's opinion said undistributed fact or 13 unrebutted. In each of the three distribution channels 14 15 which were defined and described, the companies were 16 direct competitors. We are not direct competitors here 17 in any distribution channel. We are a customer. They 18 are a supplier. 19 Two, the Court found concrete evidence of a loss 20 of market share and a loss of sales and access to There's none here. There's no evidence of 21 customers. 2.2 that. There's no proof of that. They can't point to a 23 single sale. Again, the evidence is that what we do 24 helps them sell to Cablevision, and ComCast, and others 25 so they can effectively compete with us better, but they

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haven't shown a single customer they have lost based on that, unlike, I think it was Wal-Mart was the biggest customer in the Bosch case, direct proof of a loss of a customer. And since we don't compete for those customers, they have lost nothing to us. There's no evidence of that. And then the third point, which in Bosch may have been, if you look at the transcript of the oral argument or the tape of the oral argument, may have been the most important factor. It certainly was a major factor in the decision. Bosch or Pylon, the defendant in Bosch had real serious questions about whether they could satisfy the judgment, and you can't say that damages are an adequate remedy and there's no need for an injunction if the defendant can't satisfy the judgment. And they were quite mushy. They were asked, Can you satisfy the judgment? Are you good for it? answer was, mma, mma, mma. This is exactly the opposite situation. As your Honor has observed, Verizon does have the resources. So whatever we owe, assuming we don't prevail on appeal, whatever we end up owing them for the period of time in which we are still, by their theory, continuing to infringe, we have the resources to satisfy the judgment for that. And with respect to those damages, at this point

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your Honor has ordered that we enter a bond. have the belt and the suspenders in terms of that. the Bosch case the injunction was ordered because each of these three factors was there as a matter of undisputed 4 fact, and in our case it's undisputed that none of those factors are here. Now, there are other problems with the issuance of an injunction that I just raised to make sure that your Honor has them in mind as you contemplate the decision here. 10 First, an injunction under the federal rules has to be specific in scope and definition, which makes 12 sense. If you are going to be ordered by Court on pain of intent to do or refrain from doing something, it can't just be stop infringing the patent. You know, it needs 16 to be --THE COURT: What was nonspecific about the language? The Court didn't understand that argument by What's nonspecific about the language that ActiveVideo has raised in the brief regarding the two patents? The Court didn't understand what was 2.2 nonspecific about that. MR. GUTMAN: Sure. Well, first of all, your 24 Honor, it was only raised in their reply brief. no formal order or anything like that. It was only --

1 THE COURT: You say raised in their brief. The 2 question still is what's nonspecific about it? 3 MR. GUTMAN: Sure. There are several problems. The first is that it includes the word "including," and 4 5 there are a long line of cases -- I don't recall whether they were in our original briefing, but I would be happy to submit something supplemental pointing them out to your Court -- where injunctions were bounced for having 8 9 included the word "including" because that suggests that 10 other things might be precluded. 11 Second, based on the jury verdict, there is no clear finding as to which of our products infringed. 12 13 They accuse two separate products: The product that we got from SeaChange and the product that we now use from 14 15 Cisco. 16 The product from SeaChange we no longer use, so that wouldn't be the proper subject of an injunction, you 17 know, under any circumstances. But based on the way the 18 19 issue was presented to the jury, your Honor, where there 20 was no distinction between the old system of SeaChange and the new system of Cisco, it's not clear from the 21 2.2 verdict whether they thought both systems infringed; they 23 thought one system infringed, but not the other. 24 ambiguity and a problem. 25 The systems, obviously, had many similarities,

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but they were not identical for infringement purposes, and they were treated separately by the experts and they were dealt with separately in the testimony and the expert reports. So the notion that they, based on this verdict, are entitled to injunction under the current system, the Cisco system has that additional problem. And then the further problem is, your Honor, that they don't claim -- well, maybe they claim for the purposes of injunction, but this was an issue at trial. What do they think the scope of the patents is? all Video On Demand, or is it just Video On Demand done a certain way? In this case, again, we use products that we buy from third parties that supply everybody else in the industry. So is it anything that those companies do in those products that infringes, or is it something less than that? And we think were there to be an injunction, and I hope we have made clear we don't think there's any basis under the law or in equity for an injunction --THE COURT: Listening to your argument, then a Judge wouldn't be able to even address the question of an injunction in this case, even though the jury says there's an infringement, because you say you have to relitigate what infringes. MR. GUTMAN: Well, your Honor, the issue, if

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there's a single product and that single product is found
to infringe, and the injunction is drawn to that single
product, then there's not a problem. But here there are
two products.
         THE COURT: How about any and all products?
         MR. GUTMAN: I'm sorry?
         THE COURT: Never mind.
         MR. GUTMAN: That, we would suggest, would be
inappropriate, but I know your Honor wasn't suggesting
that.
         And, again, if we go back to the whole what is
it that they do that they say somehow gets affected by
this, they don't do Video On Demand. They provide things
that are part of the Video On Demand system, but they
don't do the basic Video On Demand. But they provide
Cablevision. That's not Video On Demand. They get that
from SeaChange. So that's the scope issue, your Honor.
And I don't mean to belabor it because I don't think your
Honor needs to get there, but it is another issue for the
Court.
         THE COURT: Well, if there's an issue if the
Court gets there, now is the time to talk about it. The
Court would hate to get there and then come back and
find, okay, now, what are we going to do about scope, or
about this problem, or that problem?
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Well, in the cases where this MR. GUTMAN: arises, your Honor, there is often a second step to the process where the parties confer and then, if necessary, come back to see the Court on the scope of an injunction. So were we to get there, and, again, I don't believe under the law we should, my suggestion would be there be a second step in that process. And, again, just as we have all that testimony from their witnesses that they don't compete with us, the same witnesses gave the same testimony that they don't compete with SeaChange. And, again, your Honor may recall a lot of this from the trial. They didn't submit an RFP response on Video On Demand. SeaChange did. Both they and SeaChange don't think of themselves as competitors. the testimony said. They and Cisco -- the Cisco gentleman that was on the stand, Mr. Hughes, was asked do you compete with ActiveVideo? He said no. ActiveVideo witnesses were asked, Do you compete with Cisco? No. So, again, it puts this whole they-aren't-competitors point into sharper focus. So those are the points that I think would make the entry of an injunction, if one were appropriate -and it isn't here -- problematic on this record and under these circumstances.

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You know, again, Mr. Miller testified at trial to the fact that Cablevision uses SeaChange to provide Video On Demand, not them. He testified that at pages 374 to 375 of the transcript. So that would be a problem. But let me just talk briefly about the balancing of equities and the public interest. Even if there were an irreparable injury, even if damages weren't an adequate remedy of the law, and neither of those is the case here, they waited five years before they filed this lawsuit, and they did that with full knowledge of how SeaChange worked and that we were using SeaChange. THE COURT: The Court has dealt with that, Mr. Gutman, and the Court doesn't put a lot of stock in You have to give me a better argument than that, that they waited five years. The Court understands the chronology of events here in this case, so the Court doesn't find that argument to be too persuasive. MR. GUTMAN: All I would say, and I know that your Honor rejected that as a latches argument, all I would point out is that the case law on the entry of injunctions in these kinds of circumstances, and again, I know your Honor has looked at them and I know your Honor is going to be spending more time with them before deciding, but a number of those decisions talk about

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factors for not granting an injunction being the fact that with full knowledge of the infringement, and defendant's 543 in evidence shows they knew exactly what we were doing and how we were doing it before we even launched the product, that that's a factor that cuts against issuing an injunction. Even if it doesn't put you out of court in latches, it does come back into play for an injunction. The failure to move for a preliminary injunction, again, you will see in the decisions language to the effect that, well, if this was such an irreparable injury, you would have done something sooner. You would have filed litigation sooner. You would have done something once it was filed. The two patents that are left in this case, and again, this is another equitable consideration, one of them expires, I think, in 2013. The other lasts longer, but they didn't accuse Video On Demand on that patent, the '582. They just accused Widgets and various things that we used with Video On Demand. That's another factor that would go into the issue of whether or not on this record as a matter of equity, balancing the equities, which your Honor would be required to do, an injunction is appropriate. Another factor, you know, again, in the meantime

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we would be running up a bill for damages for royalties. \mid I think it works out to the rate of about \$4 million a That's a lot of money. If we are wrong and the Court of Appeals doesn't rule for us, that's a lot of money, your Honor, and they would be getting that money, and that exceeds any harm they would be suffering, and it is measurable. Another point to consider in weighing the equities on an injunction is that they seek this injunction to protect their ability to continue to market the very products which the very same jury found infringed our patents. All of their argument is about the stuff they are selling to Cablevision and their ability to keep providing stuff to Cablevision. Well, your Honor may recall, it was a very short part of the trial at the end because the dollars involved aren't that large, but they were found to have induced Cablevision to infringe our patents with those very products. So, again, as a court of equity, if they are saying, gee, you may hurt our sales, I mean, apart from the fact they get royalties and damages for that if it's true, the sales they are talking about are the sales which infringed our patents. That's the very same thing the jury found. There's certainly no equity in doing that.

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And the final point, and I'm sorry to have to raise this, but I do think it's a factor that the Court needs to take into account. The eBay court talked about one of the problems with granting injunctions in these cases being the ability of the threat of the injunction, the threat of the ability to disrupt somebody's business on that kind of level as creating a disproportionate amount of leverage for use in settlement negotiations. And I do believe, your Honor, that that is what's going on here. We know. The jury didn't know, because they sought and got an in limine motion preventing this from coming before the jury, that they filed this case to retaliate for Verizon suing Cablevision in the ITC, and you have heard an awful lot about the ITC today. what's the interest in an injunction here that would generate less money? If what they say about its economic impact is right, then we will be continuing royalties if it turns out we are wrong about infringing? I would suggest to your Honor that this is for leverage in the negotiation of a resolution of a case that is not before this Court. There's no equity in that, and that's another reason why an injunction would be inappropriate under the circumstances. And I'm sorry to have to raise it,

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your Honor, but --
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                       No, that's fine. The Court has
            THE COURT:
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  heard this whole issue about what's going on in the ITC
  between the parties before. I think both parties have
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  some motives that are not clear to the Court for what
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   they are doing because of what's in the ITC, both
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   parties.
            Now, the other thing is this, though: To the
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   extent, let's say, Verizon manages to put, let's say,
   Cablevision out of business, whether it's in the ITC or
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   another place, if what you are saying about their simply
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   being a big supplier to Cablevision, then you end up
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   cutting off their revenue stream in a sense, wouldn't
        If you put Cablevision out of business, then to a
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   certain extent, certainly indirectly it affects it,
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   ActiveVideo's revenue stream would be substantially
   reduced or cut off, depending upon what happens to
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   Cablevision, right?
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            MR. GUTMAN: Well, let's take this in pieces,
   your Honor. If Verizon were to prevail and before the
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   Administrator -- I'm not counsel in the ITC matter, so
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   I'm hoping in giving this response --
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            THE COURT: I understand that.
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            MR. GUTMAN: In the Cablevision action, the ITC
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  ruled that three of the patents were infringed by
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Cablevision. One of them met the other qualifications 1 for granting a preclusion order. There aren't damages in 2 the ITC, so a preclusion order is the remedy that's 3 available. And the status of that one is not terrific 4 5 for Verizon at this point. So at this point there is no preclusion order. But assume that Verizon were able to 6 turn all of that around and get a preclusion order 8 against Cablevision and that that somehow hurt their 9 sales, ActiveVideo's sales to Cablevision, it would only 10 be because what Cablevision was doing with them or without them was infringing Verizon's patents, which 11 12 violated the law, and the ITC decided that a remedy was appropriate. 13 14 But that's not patent infringement by us. 15 would be my client enforcing their patent rights in a 16 separate forum. So that might hurt their sales to 17 Cablevision, but in the meantime -- but that has nothing to do with the injunction in this case, or the lack of 18 19 need for an injunction, because in this case at the very 20 same time if we were continuing to do what has been 21 adjudicated to infringe and if that weren't reversed on 2.2 appeal or we hadn't done something to change in the 23 meantime rather than keep running up the potential 24 liability of \$4 million a month, we would still owe 25 them. So they would still recover.

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If anything, that's an argument against the injunction because if we are enjoined and that tab for ongoing royalty stops running and Cablevision ends up being enjoined, then they are not doing business with anybody and there's no one they can turn to for money on that because both would be the result of actions by a court. So, if anything, that ends up being an argument against the injunction because absent the injunction, assuming that our conduct continues as it does, so does the potential that if we are wrong and if we lose, we owe them more money, which they wouldn't have under the other scenario. THE COURT: It seems like it's a scenario where the parties in this case probably should have gotten together and resolved this matter sooner, to be candid with you. I mean, you are suing each other. You are litigating against Cablevision, and they are litigating against you, and all the parties would have probably been better off had you figured out a way to resolve this matter short of all the money you are putting into litigation in this case. That's exactly what's clear to the Court. MR. GUTMAN: You will get no disagreement from us, your Honor, that if a settlement were doable, that would be sensible and appropriate.

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THE COURT: You are talking about money and maybe it was doable. You-all should have worked the figures in the case, but now the Court has to work the figures. MR. GUTMAN: Right. And your Honor has dealt with the figures for the interim period. I guess two points before I sit down. THE COURT: Yes. I want you to talk about the same thing I asked Mr. Johnson about having to do with the sunset provisions and these royalties. Once again, after listening to you-all, the Court doesn't know where it's necessarily going to end up here, but wherever it is, it hopes it has some information so that it can deal with all of the issues. Right. And were the Court to enter MR. GUTMAN: an injunction, which, again, we believe the Court should not, it would certainly be appropriate to have a sunset provision, providing that the injunction did not take effect until some period of time that allowed us to make alternative arrangements. Again, looking at the case law, your Honor, you know, virtually all of these cases where there is an injunction provides for that. In the BroadCom versus QualComm case which they cite in their brief, and I think we cite too, the district court gave QualComm 20 months

based on the complexity of the issue in which to come up 1 2 with an alternative before the injunction would take 3 effect. 4 -In-I'm forgetting which case it is for the moment, but in one of the cases -- oh, I remember. 5 was Eye For Eye, one of the Microsoft cases in the 6 Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit stayed the injunction pending the appeal, which would be another 8 9 thing, stayed the injunction pending the appeal, ended up 10 affirming the injunction after the appeal, but the district court from Texas, I think, put in a 60-day 11 12 sunset provision, and the Federal Circuit extended that 13 to five months because that was a period of time it was 14 going to take in order to come up with an alternative 15 version of the product that didn't infringe. 16 THE COURT: Correct me if I am wrong, 17 Mr. Gutman, but did the Court hear something in this case from one of these many, many experts the parties had in 18 19 this case about Verizon having the capability to work up 20 some viable alternative within six to nine months, and 21 that was in August? 2.2 MR. GUTMAN: Well, your Honor, six to nine 23 months, your Honor did hear testimony about six to nine 24 months, and again, in terms of measuring were there to be 25 an injunction, and I get a chill every time I say that,

so were there to be an injunction, a sunset provision of 1 nine months to allow an alternative to be devised would, 2 |I think, certainly be the minimum that is necessary. 3 THE COURT: Counsel, the Court has been thinking 4 5 about all of these things here, now. Verizon, from what the Court has been able to ascertain here, just watching the way Verizon operates, is a pretty capable and able corporation, and it occurs to the Court with you-all 8 9 litigating this case so vigorously over the last months 10 and being in doubt what the end outcome of this litigation was going to be, it's hard for the Court to 11 believe that Verizon, without you saying it, has not or 12 had not begun to look for viable alternatives, depending 13 14 upon which way the ball bounced --15 MR. GUTMAN: Right. 16 THE COURT: -- instead of waiting around until 17 you had gotten out of the Court of Appeals, if you get 18 there, to figure out now what we are going to do. So the 19 Court would tend to think that prudent business strategy 20 was to have someone in the laboratory trying to figure 21 out what we are going to do if we lose this thing instead 2.2 of starting now to think about this. 23 MR. GUTMAN: No question, your Honor. I mean, 24 you are correct. 25 The thing I would point out, though, is the

solution to the problem is not a Verizon solution. These 1 are products we get from third-party vendors. But, 2 absolutely, there are conversations underway with the 3 third-party vendor to what could you do to resolve this. 4 5 And, again, doing it, implementing it, all of that would take time, which is why a sunset provision, 6 again, six to nine months, would certainly be 8 appropriate, whenever the injunction entered. And it 9 wouldn't be easy and it would be expensive, but the fact that this is something that's been under consideration 10 since the jury verdict is -- I mean, your Honor is 11 12 correct in your assumption. But, again, it still takes time. And that was true in all these other cases. 13 14 And, again, in the Eye For Eye case, Judge Davis 15 in Texas gave 60 days. The Federal Circuit stayed the injunction pending the appeal. By the time they had gone 16 through the entire appellate process and gotten a 17 decision affirming the injunction it's, I don't know, a 18 year and a half later, whatever, it was a significant 19 20 period of time, and the Federal Circuit, confirming the injunction, still said that we are going extend the 60 21 2.2 days to five months. 23 So I understand your Honor's point, but even in 24 those circumstances the other courts, including the 25 Federal Circuit, have taken steps to make sure that there

is adequate time provided to make the change. 1 Again, the idea is the injunction is not supposed to be punitive. 2 THE COURT: The Court understands that. 3 Talk to the Court about this matter of what you 4 5 believe any subscriber rate should be if the Court were put in the position where it has to deal with this 6 Mr. Johnson has argued it ought to be two 8 twenty-five and etc. What are your views on these 9 matters? 10 MR. GUTMAN: Sure. Your Honor, I don't think that it has become willful because we still believe --11 12 and again, no disrespect is intended. I mean, we 13 understand that your Honor has ruled, but we still 14 believe that on some of the grounds that we have asserted 15 we at least have a good-faith basis for believing that 16 the law may be otherwise and that the appellate court 17 will determine that. So under those circumstances, it's 18 not at all clear to me that they would qualify for a willfulness kicker. That's something they could argue 19 20 when we got there. We don't concede that that's the 21 case. 2.2 As to what would be an appropriate royalty, I 23 don't have a number. I mean, our damages expert had a 24 number at trial. I don't have the number here now, but 25 let me again suggest something that other courts have

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done in this circumstance that might be of assistance to the Court here. Were the Court, as we urged, to deny the injunction and your Honor did not want to be in the position of trying to determine later what the appropriate royalty was, one option is then not to address what the appropriate royalty is until after the appeal. I mean, there's \$140 million right now if we are wrong, there is interest if we are wrong, and there is some unknown exposure for the other money if we are wrong on appeal. That, in and of itself, I would think would give the parties plenty of incentive and opportunity to try to work something out while the case is on appeal. If the Court, you know, felt the need to have an interim royalty rate established, rather than not addressing that issue unless we had to after the appeal, that's the kind of thing where the Pace decision in the Federal Circuit provides some guidance. The parties were sent out to try and negotiate a royalty and it was a situation where it was basically you guys can come to an agreement or the Court will settle it, and then there would be a presentation as to what was appropriate, and your Honor would make that decision. So there are a lot of options available, including not addressing that issue until we hear from

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the Court of Appeals, which I, frankly, think is the
   easiest approach here. Because if it turns out that we
  are right, or we are partially right, or any of this has
  to be retried, we haven't spent a lot of time and energy
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   fighting over what the interim royalty rate is if there
   wouldn't have been one that was appropriate.
            But those are the options, your Honor, and I'm
  sorry, I don't have a number now. But, again, it would
  be perfectly precedented for your Honor to send us out to
   try and work one out or to come up with submissions to
   the Court so that we could address that issue in a more
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   thoughtful way than I can do at the moment, and I
   apologize for that.
            The last point --
            THE COURT: Another hearing?
            MR. GUTMAN: We can do it on the paper. Your
   Honor, I like coming down.
            Your Honor may find this surprising, considering
   the way I last left your courtroom, but I actually enjoy
   coming back here. Everybody has been friendly and nice,
   and the weather is much more pleasant now than when we
   left in the summer, and the food is good, and I do like
   being here. So we would be happy to come back for
   another hearing.
            The last point before I sit down is were the
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Court to entertain an injunction, we would ask, and we 1 2 mentioned this in our motion papers -- if your Honor 3 requires a separate motion, please let me know and we will file it today to make sure we are on record, but we 4 5 would ask that any injunction be stayed pending appeal. I think we made that clear in our papers, but I just want 6 7 to make that clear. And, again, if we need --THE COURT: I think you did, and that's 8 9 something the Court wondered about, what the effect, if 10 any, if the whole objective of an injunction is basically to stop the running of the harm, what's the point of 11 12 staying the injunctive relief as opposed to a sunset 13 provision because you yourself said, you know, these 14 things can get up there in the Court of Appeals and hang 15 around there for a lifetime? I mean, depending on what 16 is happening, you know, so that --17 MR. GUTMAN: And the standard, your Honor, for 18 the stay is set out in our papers and we argue it in the 19 papers, and basically, you know, if there are serious 20 issues going to the merits, and, again, I think whatever 21 the positions are as to the correctness of the decisions 2.2 before, I think there are at least serious questions 23 that -- and there would be the hardship to us in having 24 to change the system. 25 THE COURT: I understand that, but if the Court

is going to stay an injunction the other thing the Court 1 could do is simply deny the injunction because, in 2 3 effect, they cancel out each other. It's a waste of time to enter an injunction, and then turn around and stay it. 4 The better course is, of course, to deny the injunction 5 so then you don't have further hearings, scope hearings. 7 |I mean, you know, the Court understands clearly what you are arguing here. 8 9 MR. GUTMAN: Well, denying it is certainly our 10 first choice, your Honor, by a lot. But I think even if 11 the Court were to grant a stay, that issue has then been 12 resolved. Unless the Court of Appeals takes a different view, it doesn't necessarily have to be addressed, but 13 14 staying it means that if it turns out we were right and 15 that we shouldn't have been enjoined and that having to change our product and do all this stuff was really not 16 17 appropriate, we can find that out from the Court of Appeals before we have to do it. So that's the effect. 18 19 But I agree with your Honor --20 THE COURT: On the other hand, what's the contrary side of that? The contrary side of that is if 21 2.2 the Court is right and it stays the injunction, what it 23 did was it permitted the infringing activity to continue 24 for a year, or year and a half, or whatever. 25 MR. GUTMAN: Either party would have the right,

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your Honor, to go to the Court of Appeals and ask them --
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            THE COURT: You just appeal the stay, right?
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  They could appeal the stay, and you could certainly
   appeal the denial of the stay. Either way it goes,
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   there's going to be some appeals.
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            MR. GUTMAN: And I can't ask the Court of
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  Appeals for the stay if I haven't first asked your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Oh, I understand. And the beat goes
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   on.
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            MR. GUTMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
            MR. JOHNSON: Briefly, your Honor.
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            THE COURT: All right.
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            MR. JOHNSON: I promise.
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            The first question you asked him was about
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  whether there was something novel about this, quote,
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   indirect competition, and he said there were no cases.
   Pages 8 and 9 of our brief, the BroadCom case involved
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   the very situation where the Court characterized it as
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   indirect competition.
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            The CISRO case at page 9 involved a research
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   company. Some people would say that's a troll who had no
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   business, and an injunction was issued.
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            The Court, I am sure, is well aware of the cases
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  involving TiVo and Dish which have recently settled.
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   that case TiVo did not have a network. It supplied a
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recording system, and it got an injunction against Dish
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   and Dish was ultimately found to be in contempt and found
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  itself in a bit of hot water.
            But in Bosch, as I pointed out, your Honor, in
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   the OEM situation they were not direct competitors.
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  issue was the technology, and in our case the technology
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  is the delivery of the interactive services and VOD.
            Counsel has made two other points that I want to
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            Number one, he said that the jury didn't find
   whether or not it was Cisco or it was SeaChange. The
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   proof at trial was that the infringement was identical,
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   so they didn't have to find -- once they found
   infringement, it applied the legal force to both.
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            He then argued that the '582 didn't involve
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         That's not true. It does. It involved both
   because it's a specific delivery system.
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            Now, the final point I would like to make, your
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   Honor, is this. By using our technology we continue to
   lose customers, we continue to lose market share, and we
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   continue to suffer price erosion.
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            THE COURT: He said there's no proof in the
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   record to any of that.
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            MR. JOHNSON: Well, if that's true, he didn't
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  bother reading Mr. Miller's testimony and he didn't
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   bother reading the declaration of Mr. Schmandt from
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Cablevision. And I would direct the Court to those declarations, and specifically to paragraph 8 and paragraph 11 of the Cablevision. The Court has it right. If they put Cablevision out of business, they put us out of business. In the ITC they went to great length to say we are going after Cablevision and its supplier, and the supplier was CloudTV. So to argue that, oh, because we are not direct competitors as he claims, that somehow means no injunction can issue, that's just wrong, and Bosch says that. And the final point I want to make is this, your Honor, and it's pretty straightforward. We assumed the Court was going to ask us what the appropriate rate should be, and we were prepared to give the Court that rate. There is no way that counsel on that side of the table didn't know that question was coming since they put it straightforwardly in their brief and in the declaration from Dr. Carlton. The fact that they would come in here and tell you they hadn't thought about it and didn't know just is further evidence of what their strategy is, delay, delay, We want to avoid at all costs having to address the issue that that jury found we infringed, and we submit that the facts of this case justify the issuance

of an injunction and we think the appropriate remedy 1 should be the one we asked for, two twenty-five. 2 3 Thank you. MR. GUTMAN: Even more briefly, your Honor, with 4 5 respect to Bosch and the subject of direct competitors, reading from page 13 of the opinion: "In this regard, 6 Bosch points to evidence of lost market share and access to customers, Pylon's inability to satisfy a judgment 8 9 and, quote, direct -- well, all of this is a quote, 10 emphasized quote, direct competition between it and Pylon in each and every distribution channel in the relevant 11 12 market." That's what the Court wrote, and the Court 13 later describes that evidence as undisputed. Direct 14 competitor case. 15 Two, BroadCom versus QualComm, also direct 16 competitors. Both of them chip makers, both of them sold chips to handset makers, etc., etc. There is no question 17 they were direct competitors. They weren't suing a 18 19 customer. This was not BroadCom trying to enjoin 20 Motorola or Samsung or some other LG for using phones 21 that have infringing QualComm chips in them. That's this 2.2 case. That's the case here. 23 It was the chip maker against the chip maker, 24 direct horizontal competitors. So that's exactly 25 supportive of the point we were making.

1 CSIRO is completely off point. CSIRO was not a 2 competitor of any kind, direct, indirect, etc. 3 Again, in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, in eBay, or it may have been in the Court's opinion, I 4 5 don't recall, there was reference to the fact that there might be exceptions like a research institution. CSIRO is the state research institution of Australia and so they fell within that exception, and the case ended up 8 9 being reversed on other grounds on the Court of Appeals and I don't believe any court has followed CSIRO since. 10 11 TiVo, again, I don't recall the details, but I 12 believe there was evidence of direct competition in that 13 case. I stand by what I said about no evidence here. Ιf 14 your Honor looks at the record and looks at what was 15 cited, there is no evidence of loss of direct 16 competition, loss of market share, loss of customers. There's evidence directly to the contrary. 17 18 And the final point is, you know, again, the ITC stuff has nothing to do with this. If Cablevision ends 19 20 up out of business, it's because the ITC determined that 21 they broke the law and that that's the appropriate remedy 2.2 under the ITC. It remains to be seen. 23 The final point, should the Court be in a 24 position of deciding what the royalty is, that decision 25 should be based on actual evidence submitted, probably

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expert evidence submitted, whether live or by affidavit
or declaration or something, not by counsel making an
assertion in court, which is all we have heard so far for
the two twenty-five, or two thirty, or whatever.
         THE COURT: Well, you know something. The Court
could take care of that right now. I mean, the Court
could take care of it right now.
         Gentlemen, I direct both parties, both parties,
to submit within the next ten days an affidavit
indicating what it concludes the appropriate royalty rate
should be in the event this Court issues an injunction
and provides a sunset provision regarding the effective
date of the injunction. You can provide by declaration
what your viewpoint is.
         All right?
                       Thank you, your Honor.
         MR. JOHNSON:
         THE COURT: Okay. That just means that it buys
the Court ten more days, because the Court will take time
to consider it. And you-all say it's all a matter of
damages anyway, so within the next ten days I want both
parties to provide it from -- you say Mr. Miller has
addressed certain things already.
                                   You give me a
declaration from both parties regarding that issue. All
right?
         MR. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor.
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            THE COURT: And I will be in touch soon
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   thereafter.
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            Thank you for your argument. And I'm not being
   sarcastic when I say it was informative, and I think it
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   is certainly helpful, even though the Court still has to
   figure out exactly how it will resolve the issues.
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            All right.
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            MR. STILLMAN: Your Honor, also on your agenda
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   this morning is our motion regarding the '748 patent.
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                        Didn't I already rule on that?
            THE COURT:
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            MR. STILLMAN:
                          No, sir.
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            THE COURT: I thought the Court had already put
   out an order regarding reconsideration of the '748
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   patent.
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                           Well, your Honor, let me come to
            MR. STILLMAN:
   the podium. As you may recall, your Honor, this was not
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   a motion for reconsideration. You had ruled on an
   earlier motion for reconsideration.
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            THE COURT: You-all can have a seat, gentlemen.
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            MR. STILLMAN: This was a motion based upon
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  newly discovered evidence.
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            THE COURT: Okay. I remember now.
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  Mr. Stillman, you are right. You are right. That issue
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   is something that the Court has looked at, and the Court
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   has been in the process of resolving that issue.
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Court did not put out an opinion on that.
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                                               The Court has
   talked about so many things regarding this case, the
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  Court did not assert an opinion on it.
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            I think the Court can have an opinion
  forthcoming on it. Is there something else you want to
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   add other than what you have in the briefs?
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            MR. STILLMAN:
                          Well, there are some things I
   would like to talk about since we have your attention.
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            THE COURT: Let's go right on, because the Court
   has not issued an opinion on it. The Court has it under
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   consideration and under evaluation on whether there's
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   truly newly discovered evidence.
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            MR. STILLMAN: Yes, sir.
            THE COURT: The Court has some questions about
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        The Court read the memoranda of the parties, but the
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   Court had not come down one way or the other on whether
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   this is truly newly discovered evidence or not, to be
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   candid with you.
            MR. STILLMAN: Well, that's exactly what I would
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   like to talk with the Court about. And I understand that
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   you feel like you have been around the barn with respect
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   to the '748. You have made your ruling with respect to
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   invalidity, and we were disappointed by that, but we made
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   our motion for reconsideration and you ruled on that.
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            But, as you know, we learned effectively after
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the trial of this case about the existence of new evidence, and that evidence now clearly creates a triable issue with respect to the priority date that we are entitled to. And, as you know, whether or not the '689 patent, which is this web TV patent that the Court believes anticipates the '748 patent, is prior art to the '748 patent requires comparing the filing date of the '689 with the invention date of the '748 patent. We were not able to offer to the Court an earlier invention date simply because by virtue of their own independent recollections, the inventors of the '748 patent did not recall a specific time period that they were engaged in the conception of this custom browser that was designed to translate information from the Internet to a television screen. THE COURT: The problem here, Mr. Stillman, you remember during the trial Verizon cogently raised the question. We looked at the case law as to whether an inventor for the purposes of establishing the invention date could corroborate his own invention date, you know what I mean? And in this evidence that you have submitted, these notes, these notes are notes from the inventor that you are attempting to use to accomplish something that we pretty solidly found you couldn't do.

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I mean, he used his own, just notes, to attempt to
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   corroborate the invention date.
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            MR. STILLMAN: Well, your Honor, first of all, I
  |don't agree that inventor's notes could not be used as
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  part of the evidence necessary to corroborate their own
   invention. But the point is, these are not inventor's
  notes in the first place. These are, in fact,
   independent invoices that were sent that memorialize the
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   fact that work was, in fact, done.
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            THE COURT: Who sent the invoices?
            MR. STILLMAN: Well, the inventor sent the
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  linvoices.
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            THE COURT: They are the inventor's invoices?
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            MR. STILLMAN: Yes, sir, but they, nonetheless,
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  refresh the recollection in combination with that July 12
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   memorandum that we talked about in our motion about when
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   the work on that custom browser was, in fact, done.
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            We tried to locate those invoices or any
   information about when that work on the custom browser
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   was done prior to the trial.
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            I'm sorry. Obviously, you have got something on
  your mind.
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            THE COURT: It's all coming back into clear
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  focus. Go on and finish that.
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           MR. STILLMAN: And so our point simply is that
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this evidence, this newly discovered evidence, clearly creates a triable issue with respect to whether or not or what the effective priority date for the '748 patent actually is. And we believe, your Honor, that if you go 4 back and you look at that evidence -- not that evidence alone, but that evidence in conjunction with the July memorandum which we laid out in our papers which shows exactly that a prototype was finished in July of 2010, 8 which means the conception date has to occur sometime prior to that. We just didn't know precisely when. When you look at that evidence in combination, it creates a triable issue where a jury could find that we were, in 12 fact, entitled to an earlier priority date. THE COURT: Here's my question. You say it's 15 newly discovered. Yes, sir. MR. STILLMAN: THE COURT: This evidence was something that 18 existed all along. It was within the control of agents of Verizon. It was there, but apparently no effort was made to go search, do a thorough search for the information. Now, the Court found cases on record where, you know, in circumstances even better than these facts the Court has ruled it's not newly discovered evidence. There's a situation where this doctor was allegedly in China, was in China, and apparently came

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back into the States and never did a thorough search of
the place these statements were supposed to be, and they
were right where they thought they might be, but no one
         Now, you know, that's a problem.
looked.
         MR. STILLMAN: Well, let me engage that, if I
can, and I understand that argument, but the first thing
the Court has to understand is Mr. Wan is not under
Verizon's control. He was an independent contractor when
this was going on. And this is very important.
didn't control -- Verizon did not control Mr. Wan.
Believe me, if it did, we would have required that
Mr. Wan come back from China to engage in this search for
these documents. We tried at length, and, in fact, the
chronology of those efforts is laid out in some
considerable detail in our papers.
         You may recall that we talked to Mr. Wan.
was in China. We actually asked Mr. Wan if it would be
possible for us to go to his home and search
independently for those documents? Mr. Wan told us
categorically that he was not comfortable with that.
         We then sort of lost communication with
         We found an e-mail address through Mr. Lin
where we might communicate with Mr. Wan. We sent Mr. Wan
another e-mail. We then subsequently learned that
Mr. Wan was back in California.
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As soon as we found out about that, we called Mr. Wan, and he agreed and we made arrangements for him to go back to Boston to search. He then searched and produced an initial round of invoices. We thought that there were still some holes in that production. We asked him to go back again, and when he came back again, he found confirmation that, in fact, the conception of this custom browser was clearly made before May of 1996. THE COURT: Based on those invoices. MR. STILLMAN: That refreshed his recollection that that's exactly when that happened. We knew, your Honor -- if you go back and you look at that July 12th memorandum which we have discussed in our papers, we knew that the conception had to be before July because a prototype had in fact been completed by July, so sometime prior to that, there had to be conception. The problem is, neither of these inventors were willing to author a declaration until they saw those invoices that would specify with any level of certainty that that conception had to occur before May of 1996. When they went back and saw that they had, in fact, billed for it, that refreshed their recollection. And let me just say this, your Honor. This is not sort of inside-the-beltway patent law. This is just common

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If you asked me when I did something with my sense. people, I probably couldn't tell you three months ago when I exactly did it unless I saw some written evidence about what occurred. In this case when they went back and saw the invoice, it refreshed their recollection. You know, you mentioned this several times, and you are exactly right. I think you have had the opportunity to observe Verizon in its culture and the way that we went about trying this To suggest that we didn't exercise due diligence about trying to find this evidence prior to the trial of this case defies all of your experience with the way that we tried this case. I can promise you, and the evidence, I think, is supported in the declarations that were filed, Verizon left no stone unturned to locate this evidence prior to all of this. And you know, as well as I, that had we had it prior to trial, we would have used it. If there was a motion that could have been filed in this case, we would have filed it. And I know we established at least that credibility with you up until this time. So the suggestion somehow that we just sat around and couldn't locate this -- and this is information, your Honor, that was not within our custody and control. It was in the inventor's house, and he was

unwilling to have us to search for.

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The real question here, your Honor, is whether or not, based upon this newly discovered evidence, a jury should be able to look Mr. Wan in the eye and judge the content of his character and say that based upon my recollection now, having reviewed these documents, I believe that I conceived this invention prior to May of 1996, which means that the web TV patent is no longer prior art to the '748. That's the question before us, as to whether or not we are entitled to this priority date.

And I submit to the Court that if you go back and look at the declarations that were filed, I don't believe that you are going to make the determination, number one, that this evidence was in our custody and control; and number two, I don't believe you are going to find when you look at that declaration that there's anything other than material information that could help a jury make a decision about all of this should be resolved.

Now, there are a number of arguments that have been advanced by ActiveVideo in their papers about why you should deny this motion. The first is that the invoices by themselves contain insufficient detail for each and every element of the claim. Well, of course they don't and that's not the law, and I think we have

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supplied you the requisite authority for you to make that determination.

The point simply is that these invoices are

The point simply is that these invoices are corroborative only, corroborative. In other words, they helped refresh the recollection of the inventor as to when something actually took place.

The second argument that ActiveVideo made here is that Verizon didn't exercise due diligence. Well, again, I hope you appreciate the culture at Verizon with respect to how it went about trying this case, and the suggestion that we didn't do everything possible to locate this information just simply defies common sense. And, in fact, there's no evidence that we didn't. All the evidence in the declaration shows that we turned every stone to locate these invoices prior to trial.

So the real question is whether or not the evidence would allow a jury to find that Mr. Wan and Mr. Lin conceived of this invention prior to May of 1996, and I think we have laid out the chronology.

The final argument that ActiveVideo advanced in this case, your Honor, is that the invoices themselves were not created contemporaneously. Once again, that's not the law, and we have cited the *Hybritech* case, a Federal Circuit case, found at 802 F.2d 1367, for the proposition they don't need to be created

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contemporaneously. But, in fact, these invoices were created virtually contemporaneously with the exception of this custom browser, which Mr. Wan conceived clearly prior to May of 1996. 4 Now, one final point that I want to leave with the Court as you think about this very important motion. There has been a lot of discussion in the papers about Verizon's motives and how this all pertained to the ITC case, and, yes, of course, it does. We plead completely quilty to that. This is a very important patent to Verizon. Now, the Court had made a decision that this patent is 12 invalid by virtue of this web TV patent. Now, I understand that ruling and the Court has made a number of rulings that we haven't been happy about, but you have been consistent in your strike zone. So from our perspective, we simply want the opportunity to convince a trier of fact in this case that the conception of this invention was in fact prior to May of 1996 and that as a result, the '689 patent is not entitled to prior art status. 21 You can sever this issue. You can send the rest 2.3 of this case on to the Federal Circuit and be done with 24 it by simply allowing us the opportunity to go to trial on this separate case. Nothing will hold up the rest of

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The Court is entitled to certify the rest of
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   the case and the final judgment. And I think, as a
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  practical matter, we could move forward in an expeditious
   way to get a resolution one way or the other as to
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   whether or not this patent is valid or not.
            Thank you.
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            THE COURT: All right.
            MR. LYONS: Good morning, Your Honor. Mike
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  Lyons on behalf of ActiveVideo.
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            As your Honor appreciates, this is extraordinary
            They are asking for this Court to basically
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   throw out the judgment that's been entered on this
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   patent. Before they can do that, they have got to show
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   that this evidence is newly discovered. They have got to
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   show that they did exercise diligence in discovering this
   evidence. And unlike what was suggested repeatedly, the
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   showing isn't that, you know, a jury could have been
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   persuaded. It's got to be a showing that this evidence
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   is likely to produce a new outcome. And I would submit,
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   your Honor, they cannot meet any of these standards.
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            Let's start with the newly discovered standard.
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  First of all, their own papers provide ample evidence to
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   show that this is not newly discovered evidence.
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   their declaration reflects is that Mr. Wan told them
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   about this evidence in June 2010. So that was 13 months
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He said, If I had files and documents before trial. 1 2 relating to my invention, they are in my house in 3 Boston. They are in my files. Now, that was in June 2010. 4 5 A month later Verizon's counsel is representing Mr. Wan. He's their client. They are working hand in 6 Now, at any moment they could have -- and one 8 other part of the story, your Honor, Verizon's counsel is also in communication with Mr. Wan's wife. Why is that 10 important? Because Mr. Wan's wife is in Boston and has custody of documents. At any time they could have 11 12 subpoenaed her for these documents. They could have done 13 it at any time in 2010, they could have done it any time 14 in 2011, and they chose not to. 15 But what's even more troubling in this case is 16 they not only chose not to get the documents which were a hand's reach away, they didn't tell anybody. This is a 17 patent that was in three litigations. It was being 18 asserted against ActiveVideo, it was being asserted in 19 20 Texas, and it was being asserted in the ITC. As you can 21 imagine, it was a subject to discovery in all three of 2.2 these. 23 Now, counsel for Verizon knew there were 24 documents in a home in Boston, and they knew who had 25 those documents, and they knew they were relevant.

who did they tell? Nobody. They didn't tell anybody 1 about these documents. 2 3 Now, they have tried to lay the blame for everything on Mr. Wan and say, well, you know, he went to 4 5 He was in China, so we couldn't get these So putting aside for the moment the fact that Mr. Wan's wife was here the entire time in custody of the documents, but Mr. Wan was here virtually the entire time 8 that these motions were pending in this case. 9 10 His testimony in his declaration was that he was here in December of last year. We think in Boston, 11 12 although he wouldn't tell us and counsel for Verizon, 13 even though they represent him, would not tell the Court 14 candidly if he was in Boston or somewhere else. But then 15 he returned to the U.S. permanently in February. 16 Now, they have said, We lost his e-mail address. We couldn't find him. Well, why didn't they 17 pick up the phone and call his wife? I mean, that's how 18 19 they found him in the first place. Or why didn't they 20 ask the inventor, his co-inventor, which is who they eventually asked and say that's how they did find him the 21 2.2 second time. Even the exercise of the most minimal 23 diligence would have located Mr. Wan and would have 24 allowed them to get these documents. 25 Now, your Honor pointed out, counsel pointed out

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Verizon has put vast resources into this case and when they wanted to get some information, if there was a stone they wanted to turn over, they turned it over. And the reason this stone didn't get turned over is because they didn't know what was underneath it. They are assuming now that this is helpful Well, they were going to trial in three courts levidence. on this patent, and a lot of times what's in the inventor files is not all that helpful. Maybe there was prior art that should have been disclosed or maybe there was other evidence that was unhelpful in how they were reading these claims. They weren't so interested in this evidence. That's why when we filed the motion for summary judgment back in January, what does a party do when they know about relevant discovery that they don't have? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) tells a party it's very simple. When you oppose that motion for summary judgment, you tell the Court there's more information out there that we don't have yet, and you don't have to tell the Court we know exactly when we are going to be able to get it or how we are going to get it, but you put that in the papers. They didn't do that. They effectively argued that this issue is ripe for determination based on ActiveVideo's position that this was prior art and the

fact that Verizon never challenged whether it was prior 1 2 art in the summary judgment motion. 3 Now, they didn't challenge whether it was prior art in their motion for reconsideration. They didn't 4 invoke Rule 56(d) in their motion for reconsideration 5 which was pending before this Court until June 30. 6 7 They didn't even tell this Court when they finally reconnected with Mr. Wan. And just prior to 8 9 trial in conversations with him about how to get these 10 documents that had been requested by multiple parties in litigation discovery and hadn't been turned over, they 11 12 didn't tell the Court. They got the first set of documents from 13 14 They didn't like those documents. They weren't 15 What did they do? Did they come to court? 16 they tell ActiveVideo? No, they didn't tell anybody. 17 They said, Go back to Boston, Mr. Wan, and find us some documents we can work with. 18 19 He went back. It was only until he came back 20 the second time with something that they thought they 21 could make a motion out of that they decided to tell 2.2 anybody about what was going on, and we would submit, 23 your Honor, that this is just too late. This is not 24 diligence, this is not newly discovered, and it was not 25 fair conduct.

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The final issue, your Honor, is whether this evidence is likely to produce a new outcome. So it's not a matter of whether this is some evidence that might have some influence on some juror; it is likely to produce a new outcome. Now, every document that they are relying on is later than the prior art that they say they concede The earliest document that they have unearthed is from late June, and they have to show that they actually conceived in May. So they don't have even one document in the relevant time period. Now, the one document in late June is an invoice that does refer to work that went on in May. Now, counsel did, candidly, concede that this invoice doesn't actually show where the elements of the invention are, and he's absolutely right about that. I mean, this is an invoice showing the work that was done, and it was not intended to be a technical discussion of inventions or ideas; it's just not there. And we had focused on some of the specific aspects of what they had argued was really a crux of

And we had focused on some of the specific aspects of what they had argued was really a crux of their invention was this transforming the interactive elements on a web page from something like a hyperlink that was something that you could work with a remote control. They have no evidence that could possibly show

that they conceived at that time, and the documents they 1 2 are relying on don't corroborate the invention. 3 And the standard is not, as counsel for Verizon has suggested, it's enough that these documents refresh 4 your recollection and somehow that's corroboration. No, 5 corroboration means there's an independent evidentiary basis so that you are not relying exclusively on the testimony of the inventor. The reason for the 8 9 corroboration rule is because they don't want an inventor to be tempted to remember, Oh, boy, if I could just say I 10 invented this in May rather than June, I can get behind 11 12 this one piece of prior art that's causing all this 13 trouble and so that's what I'm going to put in my 14 declaration. 15 And so they are essentially offering the exact testimony and relying on the exact testimony that the 16 Court said is not enough. We don't want to hear 17 inventors telling a tale about what they did. We want to 18 19 see independent corroborating evidence of documents. I 20 submit, your Honor, even if this stuff was timely, even 21 if they had been diligent in finding it, there is no way 2.2 this evidence is going to produce any kind of new result 23 in this case. 24 Thank you, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: I will give you a short rebuttal,

Mr. Stillman. 1 2 MR. STILLMAN: Yes, sir, very short. 3 Your Honor, first of all, with respect to whether or not this evidence would likely produce a 4 5 different result, I think you can go back and put yourself in a position that had you had access to this 6 evidence a year ago and the declaration from the inventor about these invoices refreshing his recollection that in 8 9 fact he conceived of this in May of 1996, you would have made the determination that there was a triable issue 10 with respect to the conception date and that a jury or a 11 12 finder of fact would be required to hear that testimony 13 and to weigh up Mr. Wan's demeanor and character on the 14 stand, to listen to what he said about when that was in 15 fact conceived. 16 And so, would there be a different result? 17 Obviously, nobody can sit here and tell you what a jury would do, but the real question is whether or not they, 18 19 Verizon, would be entitled to its day in Court had this evidence been available to it at the time. And I promise 20 21 you had it been available, we would have presented it to 2.2 you. 23 Now, before you make your judgments about 24 whether I am right or whether Mr. Lyons is right with 25 respect to this due diligence, may I encourage you to go

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back and look at the declarations that have been submitted in this case by Verizon with respect to the chronology and the detail and sequence of events which led to the discovery of this information. THE COURT: The Court has already read the declarations. MR. STILLMAN: And when you do that, I don't believe that anyone could read that and say that Verizon purposely sat on this or sat back because it was worried about what it was going to discover. We had nothing but upside. Our patent had been held to be invalid six months earlier. We had nothing to gain by sitting on evidence that could somehow corroborate a conception date in May of 1996. Now, Mr. Gutman also reminded me you asked me the question, you admitted the notebooks of the inventors in this case that were offered, in fact, by ActiveVideo. So that evidence did, in fact, come in, and it's exactly the kind of evidence that we are talking about here that would serve to corroborate a conception in May of 1996. So we believe that there has been due diligence, but, frankly, that's your call. I mean, this is a discretion, and I have to admit that. You have to make that judgment. I can sit up here and argue that there's been due diligence all day long, and Mr. Lyons can say

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no, there hasn't. But in your heart I think you have to
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  believe that Verizon, had it had access to this
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  information, would have presented it to you a long time
  earlier. And, in fact, if you look at those
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  declarations, you will see that we did everything
   possible to get access to it at a prior time.
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            And for all of those reasons, your Honor, we
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  believe that the Court should exercise, in fairness, your
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  discretion, because it is your discretion.
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            THE COURT: Let me ask you one question.
  Mr. Lyons said that the wife -- I don't recall this from
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   the declaration. I don't know whether it was there or
   not, and the Court did read the declarations of each of
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   Verizon's counsel involved who worked on those issues.
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            Mr. Lyons made the statement that the wife was
   available and that you did not approach the wife in an
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   effort to get in the house to find the documents.
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            MR. STILLMAN:
                           Right.
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            THE COURT: I can't remember anything in the
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   declarations about efforts to approach the spouse.
            MR. STILLMAN: Well, there were conversations
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   with the wife, and the wife told us, as I recall, and I
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   believe this is set out in the declarations, the wife
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   told us that her husband was in China.
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            Now, did we subpoena the wife? No, we didn't.
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And, you know, hindsight being 20-20, maybe that would have been a good thing to do. I don't know. The fact of the matter is these were documents that were in the custody and control of the husband, not the wife. And, 4 you know, I suppose somebody can always second-guess what we could have done to do something better, and I would be happy to be criticized, but --THE COURT: The Court understands the argument the documents belong to the husband. What the Court does wonder is in terms of having problems trying to contact Mr. Wan, if the spouse is available, why didn't you get 12 some telephone numbers or contact numbers from the 13 spouse? MR. STILLMAN: Well, we did. In fact, I think if you read the declaration, you will find that we did track him down in China and did have access to him in China. And that's when there were conversations about whether he would allow us to go to the house and search for the documents ourselves, and he told us when he was in China that he was comfortable with doing that. Then there was a period of time in which we sort 2.2 of lost communications with him, and we got an e-mail 23 that we thought was a good e-mail address for him from Mr. Lin and then discovered that he was, in fact, in California.

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So all of that, the due diligence and the
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   chronology and sequence of events, is really not in
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  dispute. It's all set out in the declaration. The real
  question is whether when you look at that and you
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   exercise your discretion, what do you think is fair?
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            THE COURT: Got you.
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            MR. STILLMAN: I put our motion, then, in your
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  hands because it's ultimately up to you to decide.
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            THE COURT: Well, I thank you.
            MR. STILLMAN: Thank you.
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            THE COURT: The Court will consider it along
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   with the injunction and other issues that we have here.
            Thank you, gentlemen. The Court will be in
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  touch.
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            (This hearing concluded at 12:10 p.m.)
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                         CERTIFICATION
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             I certify that the foregoing is a correct
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   transcript of the record of proceedings in the
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   above-entitled matter.
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                                /s/
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                             Sharon B. Borden, RMR, FCRR
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                                X October 28, 2011 X
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